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ABSTRACT 
Delegation versus Authority  
by Daniel Krähmer* 
The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation 
in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information 
relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. 
Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. We contribute to the literature 
by assuming transferable utility and contractibility of messages and decision rights. 
While delegation leads to loss of control, it facilitates the agent’s participation and leads 
to an informed decision. Moreover, message-contingent delegation creates incentives 
for information revelation. We derive the optimal contract for the principal and 
investigate when delegation outperforms authority. 
 
Keywords:  Delegation, Partial Contracting, Mechanism Design, Imperfect Commitment, 
 Transferable Utility  
JEL classification numbers: C72, D82, L22 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Delegation versus Autorität  
Das Papier untersucht die Bestimmungsgründe für die Delegation von Entscheidungen 
in Organisationen. Wir betrachten eine Prinzipal-Agent Beziehung, in der eine 
Entscheidung getroffen werden muss, die vertraglich nicht festgeschrieben werden 
kann. Der Agent verfügt über für den Prinzipal relevante private Information, hat aber 
andere Entscheidungspräferenzen als der Prinzipal. Im Unterschied zur bisherigen 
Literatur betrachten wir den Fall, dass Nutzen transferierbar ist, und dass der Prinzipal 
sein Entscheidungsrecht in Abhängigkeit eines Berichtes des Agenten an diesen 
abtreten kann. Delegation führt einerseits zu einem Kontrollverlust für den Prinzipal. 
Andererseits erleichtert sie die Partizipation des Agenten und führt zu einer informierten 
Entscheidung. Darüber hinaus schafft Delegation Anreize zur Informationsoffenlegung, 
wenn dem Agenten das Entscheidungsrecht in Abhängigkeit seines Berichtes übertragen 
wird. Wir untersuchen, wann es für den Prinzipal optimal ist, die Entscheidung zu 
delegieren. 
                                                 
*
  Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Helmut Bester, Jürgen Bierbaum, Paul Heidhues, Kai 
Konrad and Roland Strausz for helpful comments and discussions. 
1 Introduction
Decision making in Þrms and organizations typically aﬀects diﬀerent members in diﬀerent
ways. At the same time, the information relevant for decision making is often widely
spread through the organization. A conßict arises if those in charge of the decision have
policy preferences diﬀerent from those who hold the relevant information.
An example is installing a new production technology (e.g. computers) in a Þrm. The
employer/procurer may prefer the technology suited best for a given task but, not being a
worker, may not know the best technology. In contrast, the worker, being an expert, may
privately know the best technology but may prefer technologies with additional features
that enhance only his private beneÞt from working (e.g. ßat screens etc.). Another
example is a principal who hires an agent to perform a project (e.g. housebuilder and
architect). The agent may be specialized in running particular projects where only the
agent knows his specialization. While the principal may prefer projects in which the agent
is specialized, the agent may rather prefer prestigous or reputation enhancing projects or
projects that improve the agents human capital. Further examples arise in patient-doctor,
client-lawyer, or lender-borrower relations.
The general problem is one of communication. An agent may be unwilling to reveal
relevant information because he wants to prevent the principal from pursuing a policy
contrary to his private interests. This information revelation problem is particularly
severe when the principal cannot credibly pre-commit not to take an action detrimental
to the agent. Indeed, it is well known from the cheap talk literature that the commitment
problem generally prevents the principal from making a decision in which all of the agents
information is used (see Crawford/Sobel (1982)1).
If the principal cannot commit to an action, a simple way to use the agents information
is to decentralize decision making away from the principal to the agent.2 However, by
1For a review of the cheap talk literature see Farrell/Rabin (1996). Two recent contributions that
extend the Crawford/Sobel model to the case with two agents and a multi-dimensional action space,
respectively, are Krishna/Morgan (2000) and Battaglini (2001).
2If the principal can commit to an action, then decentralizing cannot improve centralized decision
structures. For the classical revelation principle implies that the outcome of delegation can be imple-
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giving away control, the principal may be hurt by the agents discretion. This trade-oﬀ
between loss of information and loss of control is the basis for an extensive discussion
of the information revelation problem both in political science3 and in economics4. The
general lesson from this literature is that if diﬀerences in policy preferences are not too
large, the informational beneÞts of delegation may outweigh the beneÞts of control under
cheap talk.
While cheap talk models capture situations in which contracts essentially cannot be
written, this paper considers the communication problemwhen contracts are only partially
incomplete. Particularly, we consider a situation where, on the one hand, the principals
commitment is limited by non-contractibility of actions, but, on the other hand, messages
from the agent to the principal and decision rights are contractible. We refer to authority
when the principal has the decision right and to delegation when the agent has that right.
Since decision rights are contractible, the principal can transfer control to the agent on
a contingent basis, depending on a report by the agent. We call this case contingent
delegation.
In this contracting environment, delegation serves three purposes: Þrst, because the
agent always beneÞts from delegation, delegation can be used as a reward for the agent.
It therefore facilitates participation of the agent. Second, as in environments with non-
contractible messages, it is a cheap way to make use of the agents information. Finally,
by rewarding the agent by delegation, contingent delegation provides the principal with
an additional instrument to structure the agents incentives to reveal information.
The optimal contract trades oﬀ these beneÞts of delegation against the costs accom-
panied by loss of control. The contribution of the paper is to Þnd and analyze the optimal
contract.5 The diﬃculty in Þnding the optimal contract stems from the principals limited
mented through a complete incentive compatible contract in which the principal has control over the
action (see Holmström (1984), Szalay (2001)).
3This literature asks whether a legislature should adopt an open rule (control of the principal) or a
closed rule (delegation) when it consults specialized commitees in the legislation process. See for example
Gilligan/Krehbiel (1987, 1989), Austin-Smith (1990, 1993), Epstein (1998), Krishna/Morgan (2001). For
a review see Bendor/Glazer/Hammond (2001).
4See for example Aghion/Tirole (1997), Garidel-Thoron/Ottaviani (2000), Dessein (2002).
5We restrict attention to mechanisms with one-shot face-to-face communication. We therefore refer to
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commitment. For with imperfect commitment, the standard revelation principle gener-
ally fails because a rational agent anticipates that the principal will not comply with the
(non-veriÞable) contract provisions when the agent reveals his information truthfully.
To take into account imperfect commitment, we therefore apply a generalized version
of the revelation principle as developed in Bester/Strausz (2001). Bester/Strausz show
that for a principal with imperfect commitment the best contract, as with the classical
revelation principle, is still a direct contract, that is, the message space coincides with the
state space. But, as opposed to the classical revelation principle, it may be optimal for
the principal to induce the agent to lie with positive probability.
The optimal contract highlights the mentioned purposes of delegation: if preferences
are suﬃciently aligned, there is no incentive problem. The principal optimally uncondi-
tionally delegates the decision if she is less interested in the decision than the agent since
this is a cheap way to induce participation of the agent.
As preferences become more disaligned, an incentive problem arises. If the principals
interest in the decision is small, it is still optimal to unconditionally delegate the decision
since this leads to an informed decision at relatively small costs. Conversely, if the prin-
cipals interest is suﬃciently large, it is optimal to unconditionally keep control over the
action, as costs of delegation are large.
Finally, contractible messages together with transferable utility imply that contingent
delegation may be optimal. For with contingent delegation, the participation constraint
of the agent type to whom the decision is delegated is weakened. Thus, the monetary
transfer to this type can be reduced. This, in turn, raises the opportunity cost of lying
for the other type to whom the decision is not delegated and, consequently, weakens this
types incentive constraint. Therefore, under contingent delegation incentive compatibil-
ity is achieved at lower cost than when the principal unconditionally retains control. As
a consequence, if the principals interest is only moderately larger than that of the agent
such that costs of delegation are still moderate, contingent delegation becomes optimal.
the optimal contract as the optimal contract in this restricted class. However, the principal can possibly
improve by using more general mechanisms, e.g., with a mediator (see Myerson (1991), chapter 6.7, or
Mitusch/Strausz (1999, 2000)) or with back-and-forth face-to-face communication (see Forges (1995)).
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Related Literature
Our paper is most closely related to the literature that studies the abovementioned in-
formation revelation problem. We contribute to that literature by considering a partially
incomplete contract environment. Closest to our setup are the papers by Dessein (2002),
Garidel-Thoron/Ottaviani (2000), and Baron (2000). In contrast to us, Dessein focuses on
non-transferable utility and assumes that control can be transferred on a non-contingent
basis only. Also Garidel-Thoron/Ottaviani do not allow for contingent delegation, but, as
we, they do consider monetary transfers. Yet, they restrict attention to linear payment-
contracts but do not show that they are optimal. Baron, in a political science context,
also considers monetary transfers, but his notion of delegation diﬀers from ours. In his
approach, the agent may or may not propose a policy to the principal. Under authority
(open rule), the principal chooses an action after the agent has or has not proposed a
policy. Under delegation (deference), if a proposal is made, the principal is committed
to enact the proposal, while if no proposal is made, the principal chooses an action by
discretion. Baron shows that deference generally dominates open rule, but he does not
derive the optimal contract.
Similar to us, also Aghion et al. (2002) study information revelation in an environment
with partially incomplete contracts. The main diﬀerence is that Aghion et al. consider
a two-stage scenario where the principal can delegate control only in the Þrst but not in
the second period. Delegation may then serve as a means to test the agent.
Our model is also related to the literature in which the allocation of authority interacts
with the agents optimal eﬀort choice. In contrast to these papers, in our model the
agents choice of action (under delegation) is independent from the allocation of authority.
In Aghion/Tirole (1997) transfering authority strengthens the incentives for an initially
uninformed agent to search for promising projects, but is accompanied with loss of control
for the principal. Bester (2002) considers how the optimal allocation of authority is
aﬀected when the agent chooses his work eﬀort only after a project has been selected.
Baker/Gibbons/Murphy (1999) derive conditions under which delegation and high eﬀort
can be supported as an equilibrium in a repeated game when decision rights are not
contractible.
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The information revelation problem is also studied by Mitusch/Strausz (1999, 2000.
Rather than on delegation, they focus on mediation. They consider a mediator who
communicates with the agent and afterwards makes a policy proposal to the principal.
The proposal rule is optimally designed by the principal. Mediation can improve pure
cheap talk provided that the agents incenctive to lie under cheap talk is not too large.
Finally, we mention a rationale for delegation as pointed out by social psychologists
and as modelled in Benabou/Tirole (2000). There, delegating decisions to the agent may
boost the agents self-conÞdence and thereby stimulate eﬀort.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section 3 the
optimal contract is derived. Section 4 discusses the robustness of our results, some possible
extensions, and the relation of the model to the theory of the Þrm. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A principal, P (she), hires an agent, A (he), to work on a project. The principals and the
agents payoﬀ from a project depends on some action y that is (irreversibly) chosen before
the project is actually conducted.6 E.g., y may represent the production technology the
agent has to use. Actions can be chosen either by the principal or by the agent, but only
the agent is able to work on the project. We assume that y ∈ Y = R.
In addition, payoﬀs depend on a state of the world, t. E.g., the agent may be suited
better or worse to work with a particular technology. We assume that there are two states
of the world, t0 and t1, with ex-ante probabilities γ0 and γ1, respectively. Without loss of
generality, t0 = 0, t1 = 1.
The agent has perfect private information about the true state of the world. By
contrast, the principal is entirely ignorant. (Hence, A is an expert.) We identify the state
of the world with an agents type and denote an agent of type t by At.
Payoﬀs from projects are as follows. If in state t action y ∈ Y is taken, the principals
6After project choice, the agent has no discretion when working on the project, that is, there is no
ex-post moral hazard.
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and the agents utilitygross of potential transfersare respectively given as
v (y, t) = −λ (y − t)2 , (1)
u (y, t) = − (y − (t+ b))2 . (2)
The parameter b ≥ 0 measures the extent to which incentives are disaligned and is called
bias. The larger is b, the more diﬀer the parties preferences with respect to action y ∈ Y .
The parameter λ > 0 captures the idea that decisions may aﬀect players diﬀerently and is
called the principals interest relative to the agents. If λ > 1, deviations from a players
most preferred action entail more serious losses for the principal than for the agent. In
this case the principal has a stronger interest in the decision than the agent. If λ < 1,
the reverse holds. Which case is the relevant one depends on the application in question.
Throughout we assume that utility is transferable.
Most Preferred Actions
The principals most preferred action in state t is yPt = t, and agent Ats most preferred
action is yAt = t + b. Notice that agent A1 prefers the principals most preferred action
in state 1 to the action most preferred by the principal in state 0. This implies that if
the principal had the decision right and was naive such that she believed any reports sent
by the agents about their types, agent A1 would not have an incentive to lie. We call an
agent with this property compatible7. Formally, agent At is called compatible if and only
if u
¡
yPt , t
¢ ≥ u ¡yPs , t¢ for t 6= s.
Note that agent A0 may or may not be compatible depending on the size of b. Indeed,
agent A0 is compatible if and only if b ≤ 1/2. The communication problem arises if agent
A0 is not compatible. In this case, if the principal had the decision right and was naive,
agent A0 would not communicate his type truthfully but pretend to be agent A1.
Contracts and Decision Rights
Disaligned preferences in combination with asymmetric information give rise to the men-
tioned conßict between the principal and his agent. To mitigate this conßict, parties write
7This term is borrowed from Mitusch/Strausz (1999).
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an explicit contract. We shall look for the contract that, from the principals perspective,
optimally resolves this conßict.
We assume that contracts are partially incomplete. More speciÞcally, we assume
that actions are non-contractible. By contrast, decision rights and monetary transfers
are contractible. Moreover, the assignment of the decision right and payments can be
made contingent on messages sent from the agent to the principal, that is, we assume
contractibility of messages.
More precisely, the contracting game is as follows. The principal designs a message
space M and oﬀers the agent a contract Γ = (M,αm, wm). If the agent accepts the
contract, the agent sends a message m ∈ M to the principal. Then, contingent on
message m, the principal either delegates the decision or keeps control over the action.
If αm = 1, the principal chooses an action (authority). If αm = 0, the agent chooses an
action (delegation).8 Finally, the principal pays the agent a message-contingent transfer
wm.
If the agent rejects, the project cannot be conducted, and both players receive their
reservation utility.9 We normalize the agents reservation utility to 0. The principals
reservation utility is v ∈ R. The size of v reßects beneÞts from trade: the smaller is v,
the higher are the beneÞts from trade.10
Remark (Screening): The size of v determines whether the principal beneÞts from the
relation at all. If v is very large, the best the principal can do is simply to oﬀer a con-
tract that is rejected by both agent types. If v is moderate, the principal may optimally
screen between the agents by making an oﬀer that is rejected by exactly one agent type.
To illustrate this, consider the contract that oﬀers a wage b2 and gives the principal the
decision right. Then it is an equilibrium that A1 rejects, and A0 accepts. For in this case,
8The restriction to deterministic assignments α ∈ {0, 1} is made for computational simplicity.
9This assumption is similar to Aghion et al. (2002). In contrast, Dessein (2002) and Baron (2000)
assume that the principal can choose an action without the agents consent. This is appropriate if, e.g.,
the agent provides only pure advice but is not needed to work on the project.
10Of course, we could equivalently specify the principals utlity as v (y, t) − v, and normalize her
reservation utility to 0.
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P beliefs that t = 0, if the agent accepts and chooses action y = 0. Agent A0 would there-
fore get − (1 + b)2 + b2 < 0 from accepting, while agent A1 gets 0. Ex ante, this contract
gives the principal expected utility of −γ0b2 + γ1v. However, if v is small, screening of
this kind can never be optimal since P can guarantee herself a payoﬀ of at least −λb2 by
unconditionally delegating the decision and paying a wage of 0. To set aside screening
issues, we assume in the sequel that v ≤ −λb2. This makes sure that the principal will
optimally make contract oﬀers that are accepted by both agent types.
3 Delegation and Authority
Before characterizing the optimal incomplete contract of the form Γ = (M,αm, wm), we
shall Þrst consider two benchmark cases: the case with complete information and the case
with contractible actions.
3.1 Benchmark 1: Complete Information
Under complete information, the principal knows the type of the agent, that is, γ0 = 1
or γ1 = 1. Thus, messages are obsolete, and the principal unconditionally chooses either
α = 1 (authority) or α = 0 (delegation) and a wage w.
Under authority, the principal chooses her most preferred action yt = t and receives
gross utility 0. Thus, the agent obtains gross utility −b2. Accordingly, the principal
optimally chooses wage w = b2 to induce participation of the agent. Hence, the principals
utility is −b2.
Under delegation, the agent chooses his most preferred action yAt = t + b in state t.
This leaves him with gross utility of 0 in either state. Therefore, the principal optimally
chooses w = 0. Moreover, the principal receives utility −λb2 in either state. Thus, the
principals utility is −λb2. This implies the following result.
Proposition 1 With complete information, the principal optimally delegates the decision,
if, and only if, λ ≤ 1.
This simply says that under complete information the party with the higher stake in the
8
decision should be given the decision right. Though simple, this result is not completely
trivial. For it illustrates the participation purpose of delegation. The principal has to
reward the agent for working on the project also if the latter has no informational exper-
tise. He may do this either by monetary compensation or by transfering control. If the
principals interest is small, she prefers the latter.11
3.2 Benchmark 2: The Complete Contract with Perfect Com-
mitment
If the action is contractible, the principal can perfectly pre-commit to an action ex ante.
In particular, she can commit to the action the agent would take if he had the decision
right. Therefore, any contract in which the agent has the decision right can as well be
implemented through a contract in which the principal has the decision right. Thus,
without loss of generality, αt = 1.
Moreover, since the principal can perfectly pre-commit to a mechanism, we can ap-
ply the classical revelation principle to Þnd the optimal contract for the principal. The
principals problem writes
max
y,w
X
t∈{0,1}
£−λ (yt − t)2 − wt¤ γt (3)
s.t.
ICt : − (yt − (t+ b))2 + wt ≥ − (ys − (t+ b))2 + ws for t 6= s (4)
IRt : − (yt − (t+ b))2 + wt ≥ 0. (5)
Here, yt and wt denote message-contingent actions and transfers (wages), respectively.
The solution of the program is as follows. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 2 DeÞne bb = 1 + λ
2λ
, eb = 2 + γ1 (λ− 1)
2γ1λ
. (6)
11That delegation facilitates participation is also pointed out in Aghion/Tirole (1997), section IV.B.
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Then with perfect commitment optimal actions are given by
y0 =
b
1 + λ
, (7)
y1 =

1 + b
1+λ
if b ≤ bb
1
2
+ b if bb < b ≤ eb
γ1λ+1
γ1(1+λ)
+ b
1+λ
if b > eb.
(8)
Furthermore, A1 gets just his reservation utility and A0 gets an information rent if b is
suﬃciently large, that is,
w0 =

(y0 − b)2 if b ≤ eb
(y0 − b)2 + 1 + 2b− 2y1 if b > eb,
(9)
w1 = (y1 − (1 + b))2 . (10)
Unsurprisingly, the results exhibits familiar features of standard adverse selection models.
There is no distortion at the top. That is, y0 equals the eﬃcient action under complete
information. Also, agent A1 is kept at his reservation utility. Notice however that for
small bias (b ≤ bb) also y1 equals the eﬃcient action under complete information, and
also A0 only gets his reservation utility. Particularly, agency costs are 0. However, as b
increases, it is no longer optimal to implement the eﬃcient action in state 1 since this
can only be done at the price of a large w0 so as to ensure incentive compatibility for A0.
Rather, it is cheaper to provide incentives for A0 by deviating from the eﬃcient action in
state 1 and thus to pay agent A0 a smaller information rent.
3.3 The Incomplete Message-Contingent Contract with Imper-
fect Commitment
We analyze now the contract with imperfect commitment. If the principal cannot com-
mit to an action ex ante, the classical revelation principle fails. This is because the agent
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anticipates that the principal, under authority, will use her discretion and thereby hurt
the agent if he reports his type truthfully. In other words, the contract of Proposition 2
is not feasible with limited commitment. To Þnd the optimal contract, we can apply the
generalized version of the revelation principle of Bester/Strausz (2001). As shown there,
the optimal contract, as with the classical revelation principle, is still a direct contract.
That is, the message space, as with the classical revelation principle, coincides with the
type space. Thus, M = {0, 1}. A contract Γ then induces a Bayesian game with the
following strategies and payoﬀs.
Strategies: The agents strategy consists of a probability distribution over messages and
an action that he takes if the decision is delegated. For s, t ∈ {0, 1} denote by σst the
probability that agent At sends message m = s, that is,
σst = P [m = s |At] . (11)
Denote by yAt ∈ Y agent Ats action in case of delegation.
The principals strategy is a function that maps messages into actions. For s ∈ {0, 1}
denote by ys ∈ Y the principals action contingent on having received message m = s.
Moreover, the principal holds a belief about the state of nature conditional on the message
received. Denote by µts the principals belief that the agent is of type t conditional on
having received message m = s, that is,
µts = P [At|m = s] . (12)
Payoﬀs: For given contract Γ = (αt, wt) and strategies
¡
σst, y
A
t
¢
, ys the principal re-
ceives message s in state t with probability γtσst. In this case, she obtains gross utility
−λ (ys − t)2 if αs = 1, and −λ
¡
yAt − t
¢2
if αs = 0. Furthermore, she pays the agent the
transfer ws. Thus, P s expected utility is given by
V =
X
t,s∈{0,1}
γtσst
h
αs
¡−λ (ys − t)2¢+ (1− αs)³−λ ¡yAt − t¢2´− wsi . (13)
Likewise, agent Ats expected utility from sending message m = s is given by
U (s; t) = αs
¡− (ys − (t+ b))2¢+ (1− αs)³− ¡yAt − (t+ b)¢2´+ ws. (14)
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In a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, actions have to be optimal given beliefs. Ac-
cordingly, whenever the decision is delegated, agent At chooses his most preferred action
yAt = t+ b. Thus,
V =
X
t,s∈{0,1}
γtσst
£
αs
¡−λ (ys − t)2¢+ (1− αs) ¡−λb2¢− ws¤ , (15)
U (s; t) = αs
¡− (ys − (t+ b))2¢+ ws. (16)
Intuitively, because the agent anticipates that the principal will use revealed information
in a way detrimental to the agent, it might be very expensive for the principal to induce
truthful revelation by the agent. It may therefore be optimal to induce the agent to
misrepresent his type with positive probability. In this case, the agent has to be kept
indiﬀerent between messages. Formally, the generalized revelation principle states that
the optimal contract for the principal is given as the solution to the following program.
max
σ,y,α,w
V (17)
s.t.
ICt : U (t; t) ≥ U (s; t) for t 6= s (18)
IRt : U (t; t) ≥ 0 (19)
IND : [U (t; t)− U (s; t)] σst = 0 for σst ∈ (0, 1) (20)
OPT : ys ∈ argmax
y
X
t∈{0,1}
µts
£−λ (ys − t)2¤ (21)
BayR : µts =
σstγt
σstγt + σssγs
(22)
Conditions IC and IR are the usual incentive compatibility and (interim) individual ra-
tionality constraints12. The three additional constraints account for limited commitment.
Condition IND says that an agent has to be indiﬀerent between messages if he actively
mixes between messages. Moreover, in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the principal must
choose an optimal action given her beliefs, and these beliefs must be consistently derived
12Following Garidel-Thoron/Ottaviani (2000), the interim individual rationality constraint can be in-
terpreted as limited liability of the agent. The case with an ex-ante individual rationality constraint, or
unlimited liability, is similarly dealt with.
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by Bayes rule given the agents strategy. These are conditions OPT and BayR. Notice
that OPT implies
ys = µ1s. (23)
The principal has two instruments to induce information revelation and participation:
wages and decision rights. Raising wt or reducing αt, ceteris paribus, increases the incen-
tive to report message m = t and the participation incentive of agent At. The two instru-
ments are accompanied with diﬀerent costs. Raising monetary incentives goes along with
a higher wage bill. Transfering the decision right leads to a suboptimal action for the prin-
cipal. The costs of transfering the decision right are reßected by the term (1− αs) (−λb2)
in the principals objective. Thus, the larger is λ, the larger is the cost of delegation.
To Þnd the optimal contract, we proceed as follows. We Þrst compute an upper bound
for the principals utility. We then show that for b ≤ 1/2 or λ ≤ 1, this upper bound is
achieved by unconditional authority and unconditional delegation, respectively. Finally,
we characterize the optimal contract for the case b > 1/2 and λ > 1.
To compute the upper bound for the principals utility, suppose that the agent is
honest and reports his type truthfully even if incentive constraints do not hold and that
the principal only has to make sure participation of the agent. This would give the
principal a higher utility than when she has to respect incentive constraints. In this case,
the principal would optimally choose yt = t and set wt = αtb2 for given α. The resulting
utility for the principal would be
V = −γ0α0 · 0− γ0 (1− α0)λb2 − γ0w0 − γ1α1 · 0− γ1 (1− α1)λb2 − γ1w1 (24)
= −λb2 − b2 (1− λ) (γ0α0 + γ1α1) . (25)
Hence, if λ ≤ 1, α is optimally set to α0 = α1 = 0, resulting in V = −λb2. If λ > 1, α is
optimally set to α0 = α1 = 1, resulting in V = −b2. Hence, we have the following result.
Lemma 1 An upper bound on the principals utility is given by
V =

−λb2 if λ ≤ 1
−b2 if λ > 1.
(26)
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With this, it follows immediately that unconditional delegation is optimal whenever the
principals interest is smaller than the agents.
Proposition 3 Let λ ≤ 1, then unconditional delegation is optimal. That is, the optimal
contract has α0 = α1 = 0 and w0 = w1 = 0. P s expected utility is
V (0, 0) = −λb2. (27)
Proof : By backward induction, under α0 = α1 = 0 agent At chooses his most preferred
action yAt = t + b. This leaves At with utility u = 0 in state t. Therefore, P optimally
chooses wt = 0. Moreover, the principal receives gross utility −λb2 in either state. Thus,
P s expected utility is −λb2. Since this coincides with the upper bound V in Lemma 1,
unconditional delegation is optimal. ¤
The upper bound in in Lemma 1 is also assumed under unconditional authority when
the principals interest is larger than the agents and when both agents are compatible.
Proposition 4 Let λ > 1 and b ≤ 1/2. Then unconditional authority is optimal. That
is, the optimal contract has α0 = α1 = 1 and w0 = w1 = b2. P s expected utility is
V (1, 1) = −b2. (28)
Proof : We show that y0 = 0, y1 = 1 is an equilibrium for the contract (α, w) = (1, b2).
Indeed, since b ≥ 1/2, both incentive constraints ICt hold with strict inequality for y0 =
0, y1 = 1. Thus, both agents report their type truthfully with probability 1. However,
given truthful revelation, the principal optimally chooses y0 = 0, y1 = 1. This shows that
y0 = 0, y1 = 1 is an equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the principal receives gross utility 0 and pays wage b2 in either
state. Thus, P s expected utility is −b2. If λ > 1, this coincides with the upper bound V
in Lemma 1. Thus, unconditional authority is optimal. ¤
We now characterize the optimal contract for the remaining parameters b > 1/2 and
λ > 1. For this, we deÞne bλ (b) = 1 + γ0
γ1
2b− 1
b2
. (29)
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Proposition 5 Let b > 1/2 and λ > 1.
(i) Let λ ≥ bλ. Then unconditional authority is optimal. That is, the optimal contract
has α0 = α1 = 1. Moreover, agent A0 receives an information rent of 2b − 1, that is,
optimal wages are given by
w0 = b
2 + 2b− 1 and w1 = b2. (30)
P s expected utility is
V (1, 1) = −b2 − γ0 (2b− 1) . (31)
(ii) If λ < bλ, then contingent delegation is optimal where the decision is delegated
contingent on announcement of type t = 1. That is, the optimal contract has α0 = 1,α1 =
0. Moreover, no agent receives an information rent, that is, optimal wages are given by
w0 = b
2 and w1 = 0. (32)
P s expected utility is
V (1, 0) = −γ0b2 − γ1λb2. (33)
The proof is in the appendix. The proof also shows that in our speciÞcation it is always
optimal for the principal to induce perfect truthtelling.13 As a consequence, if the principal
has the decision right, she implements her most preferred action.
Proposition 6 Irrespectively of b and λ the principal optimally induces agents to report
truthfully and chooses the corresponding action if she keeps the decision right, that is,
σ00 = 1, σ11 = 1, (34)
y0 = 0, y1 = 1. (35)
Figure 1 portrays the optimal contract in λ-b-space.
13This results from the assumption that both interest and bias are state-independent. If this is relaxed,
the computational eﬀort rises considerably.
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Figure 1: Decision Rights, Interest, and Bias
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
0.5 b
λ
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
| {z }
compatible agents
| {z }
A0 not compatible
...
...
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
...
...
....
....
......
.........
..............
...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
α = (0, 0)
α = (1, 1)
α = (0, 0)
α = (1, 0)
α = (1, 1) λ
....
....
....
....
....
The intuition for the optimal contract is as follows. In general, if the principal retains
control, she has to pay the agent a monetary wage to induce both participation and infor-
mation revelation. This wage reßects the loss she inßicts on the agent by her discretion.
On the other hand, the cost of delegation is the loss the principal incurs by the agents
discretion.
Now, if the principals interest is smaller than the agents, the principals loss through
the agents discretion is smaller than the agents loss through the principals discretion.
Therefore, if λ ≤ 1, the principal always prefers to delegate control.
For b ≤ 1/2, both agents are compatible, and there is no incentive problem. Both
agents reveal their type without being paid an information rent. Therefore, whether to
delegate or not is motivated exclusively by participation considerations.
Yet, as b increases, an incentive problem arises since agent A0 becomes incompatible.
Therefore, if the principal retains control, the principal not only has to compensate the
agent to participate, but she also has to pay the agent so as to induce information revela-
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tion. By contrast, delegation saves the principal to pay this cost. In this sense, if λ ≤ 1,
delegation is a cheap way to make use of the agents information.
As λ becomes large, the cost of delegation rises. If λ ≥ bλ, the costs of delegation dom-
inate the monetary costs for information revelation under authority, and unconditional
authority is optimal.
For moderate interest (1 < λ < bλ) contingent delegation is optimal. Delegating the
decision to the agent who announces to be type A1 mitigates the incentive problem with
respect to agent A0. The reason is as follows. Delegating the decision to agents who
report to be type A1 weakens the participation constraint for agent A1. Thus, the wage
w1 can be reduced as compared to authority (α1 = 1). This aﬀects agent A0 in two ways.
On the one hand, with respect to transfers, lying becomes less attractive for agent A0. On
the other hand however, with respect to actions, lying becomes more attractive for agent
A0 because he is given the decision right if he misrepresents his type. Yet, with state-
independent bias the Þrst eﬀect always dominates the second eﬀect. That is, contingent
delegation creates incentives for information revelation.14 For the principal contingent
delegation is beneÞcial, as monetary transfers can be reduced. However, it is also costly,
as agent A1 is granted the decision right. The balance depends on the principals interest.
If the principals interest is only moderately larger than that of the agent such that costs
of delegation are still moderate, contingent delegation becomes optimal.15
Note further that the eﬀect requires both contractibility of messages and transferable
utility. It does not appear in cheap talk models such as Dessein (2000), and Garidel-
Thoron/Ottaviani (2000).
To sum up, the optimal contract highlights three purposes of delegation: it facilitates
participation and leads to an informed decision. Moreover, contingent delegation creates
incentives for information revelation.
There are several further noteworthy points. For Þxed λ with 1 < λ < bλ, there is
14This incentive eﬀect is diﬀerent from the incentive view in Aghion/Tirole (1997) where delegation
stimulates the agents eﬀort.
15Notice that the incentive eﬀect requires that the participation constraint for A1 is suﬃciently weak-
ened when switching from authority to delegation. This is not necessarily the case for state-dependent
bias, for instance, if A1 is not biased at all.
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no monotone relation between (unconditional) authority and (contingent) delegation for
increasing bias b. This may appear counterintuitive because for Þxed λ the principals
loss under delegation increases b, and it may therefore seem that control should be in the
principals hands for larger bias. But this is not true. For also the monetary transfers
necessary for information revelation under authority rise in b, since also the agents loss
under authority increases for larger bias. In particular, if the agent is equally interested
in the decision as the principal, that is, if λ = 1, then it is never optimal for the principal
to unconditionally remain in charge of the decision.
Finally, the optimal contract illustrates the role of contractible messages. If λ ≤ 1 or
b ≤ 1/2, the optimal contract can be implemented as a contract which unconditionally
speciÞes a decision right and a transfer, that is, a contract which does not make use of
messages. If λ ≤ 1, the principals interest in the decision is so small that she optimally
delegates to both agents. If both agents are compatible, there is no need to give agents
diﬀerent incentives. Only if λ > 1 and b > 1/2, the optimal contract makes use of
messages. In this case, the principal wants to keep at least some authority and therefore
has to treat agents diﬀerently so as to achieve incentive compatibility.
4 Discussion
We now discuss the robustness of our results and some possible model extensions. Finally,
we shall discuss the relation of our model to the theory of the Þrm.
Most of our speciÞcations are made so as to keep the model tractable. As mentioned
above, a state-independent bias is important to generate the incentive eﬀect of contingent
delegation. Implicit in our loss speciÞcation is also that properties like slope or curvature
of the loss functions are state-independent. It is an open question how more general loss
functions would aﬀect our results.
The two-type assumption leads to the result that there is no incentive problem for
small bias. Indeed, it can be easily seen that in our model pure cheap talk gives rise to
perfect information transmission for small bias. While this is a general fact for a model
with discrete types, in models with a continuum of types cheap talk typically gives rise
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only to intermediate degrees of information transmission (for instance in Crawford/Sobel
(1982)). Therefore, our results might change with a continuum of types, and it would be
desirable to allow for a higher number of types. However, it is not clear how the generalized
revelation principle in Bester/Strausz (2001) carries over to a continuum of types. Further,
the diﬃculty with a higher number of discrete types is that the computational eﬀort
considerably increases in the number of types.
The model can be extended along several lines and raises a series of questions for
future research. First of all, it would be interesting how the allocation of decision rights
aﬀects incentives for information acquisition or specialization when the agent is initially
uninformed.
To get an interesting problem, one needs to assume that the principal can neither
observe eﬀort nor whether the agent is informed or not. In this case the principal faces
a moral hazard problem on part of the agent. In addition to incentives for information
revelation the principal then has to provide incentives to induce eﬀort. Delegation may be
a cheap way to motivate the agent, as he can use the information gained according to his
own preference. Notice however that a thorough analysis of this case amounts to solving
our model for the case with three agent types. For the uninformed agent corresponds to
an agent of type t = γ1 + b with most preferred action y = γ1 + b.
A further extension concerns the number of agents. The Crawford/Sobel model
has only recently been extended to the case with two agents (Krishna/Morgan (2000),
Battaglini (2001)), and the comparison with delegation under non-transferable utility is
investigated inKrishna/ Morgan (2001). As for transferable utility however, the extension
is not straightforward, as it is not clear whether and how the generalized revelation princi-
ple under imperfect commitment carries over to multiple agents (see Bester/Strausz 2000).
Relation to the Theory of the Firm
Our model is related to the theory of the Þrm. We can interpret the principal as a
buyer and the agent as a seller who produces an intermediate good and delivers it to
the buyer. The agent comes in two types (states) which refer to his specialization. The
action concerns the implementation of a production technology to produce the good. The
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principals utility may be state-dependent because the agents type may aﬀect the quality
of the product.
Under unconditional authority the buyer installs the technology and hires the seller
as a worker to produce the good. The utility transfer from the principal to the agent
corresponds then to the workers wage. This is suggestive of an integrated Þrm. Under
unconditional delegation the seller decides on the technology, then produces the good, and
delivers it to the buyer. The utility transfer corresponds then to the products price. This
is suggestive of a market relation. (In the parlance of the theory of the Þrm, authority
corresponds to make whereas delegation corresponds to buy.) Contingent delega-
tion corresponds to an intermediate form where the mode of transaction is determined
conditional on exchange of information prior to the actual decision.
As in transaction cost economics (Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)) and in the prop-
erty rights approach (Grossman/Hart (1986), Hart/Moore (1990), Hart (1995)), in our
model the key element to make the distinction between Þrms and markets is incomplete-
ness of contracts. In fact, analogous to the property rights view, in our agency view the
notion of vertical integration is one of control rights. However, as opposed to the property
rights theory, in our model it is asymmetric information rather than relation-speciÞcity of
investments which is the source of ineﬃciencies. Notice also the diﬀerences between our
and the transaction cost approach.16 Transaction cost economics starts from asking Why
do Þrms exist?. For it maintains that in a world without transaction costs buy always
dominates make. By contrast, our model rather provides an answer to the question
Why do markets exist?. For in a world of complete contracts, in our model make
would always dominate buy, and we could not explain the existence of markets. In this
sense, our theory can be seen as dual to transaction cost economics.
16For a discussion of the diﬀerences between the transaction cost and the property rights approach see
Whinston (2000).
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5 Conclusion
The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation
in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information
relevant for the principals best policy, but at the same time has policy preferences diﬀerent
from the principal. We analyze the information revelation problem under the assumption
of transferable utility and contractibility of messages and decision rights and derive the
optimal contract for the principal. This has not been thoroughly done in the literature
and is therefore our main contribution.
Our results show that delegation serves three purposes. As in environments with
non-contractible messages, delegation facilitates participation of the agent and may be
a cheap way to make use of the agents information. More interestingly, we show that
contractibility of messages together with transferable utility give rise to an incentive eﬀect.
Contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation in that it weakens the
incentive constraint for the agent to whom the decision is not delegated.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We show Þrst that IR1 is always binding. Notice that it cannot
be optimal for the principal to have both IR constraints hold with strict inequality. For
whether the IC constraints are satisÞed depends only on the wage diﬀerential ∆w =
w0 − w1. Hence, both wages could be reduced without violating the IC constraints.
Suppose now that IR1 is not binding. This implies that IR0 is binding, thus w0 =
(y0 − b)2. Assume for a moment that y0 ≤ 1/2+ b in the optimum. Then, the right hand
side of IC1 writes
− ¡y0 − (1 + b)2¢+ (y0 − b)2 = 2y0 − 1− 2b (36)
≤ 1 + 2b− 1− 2b (37)
= 0. (38)
Hence, w1 can be reduced until IR1 binds without violating IC1.
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We show now that indeed y0 ≤ 1/2 + b. Suppose the contrary. Then
− ¡y1 − (1 + b)2¢+ w1 ≥ − ¡y0 − (1 + b)2¢+ w0 (39)
≥ − ¡y0 − (1 + b)2¢+ (y0 − b)2 (40)
= 2y0 − 2b− 1 (41)
> 0, (42)
where the Þrst inequality follows by IC1 and the second by IR0. Hence, IR0 holds with
strict inequality which implies that IR0 must be binding, that is, w0 = (y0 − b)2. However,
P can improve by replacing y0 by by0 := 2b − y0 and setting bw0 = (by0 − b)2. For notice
that for A0 nothing changes as (y0 − b)2 = (by0 − b)2. Furthermore, IC1 still holds as
− (by0 − (1 + b))2 + w0 = 2b− 1− 2y0 ≤ 0. (43)
However, by0 is closer to 0 than is y0, and therefore P s utility increases. Thus, IR1 is
binding.
Since IR1 is binding it follows that w1 = (y1 − (1 + b))2. Moreover, IC0, IC1, and IR0
imply that ∆w must satisfy
y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1) + max {0, 2y1 − (1 + 2b)} (44)
≤ ∆w (45)
≤ y20 − y21 − 2 (1 + b) (y0 − y1) . (46)
Thus the principals problem is to choose y0, y1,∆w so as to maximize
−γ0λy20 − γ1λ (y1 − 1)2 − (y1 − (1 + b))2 − γ0∆w (47)
subject to (45). Since ∆w enters negatively in the objective, it must be that in the
optimum ∆w = y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1) + max {0, 2y1 − (1 + 2b)}. Thus, the objective
becomes
− γ0λy20 − γ1λ (y1 − 1)2 − (y1 − (1 + b))2 (48)
− γ0
¡
y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1) + max {0, 2y1 − (1 + b)}
¢
. (49)
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The Þrst order condition with respect to y0 yields
y0 =
b
1 + λ
, (50)
as was claimed.
For y1, since the objective has a kink in y1 = b+ 1/2, we need to distinguish the case
y1 < b + 1/2 (case A) and the reverse y1 ≥ b + 1/2 (case B). In case A the Þrst order
condition yields
yA1 =
γ1 (λ + b) + 1
γ1 (1 + λ)
. (51)
Notice that yA1 < b+1/2 if and only if b > (2 + γ1 (λ− 1)) / (2γ1λ) = eb. Thus, the optimal
y1 under the constraint y1 < b+ 1/2 is given as
yA1 1{b>eb} + (b+ 1/2− ε) 1{b≤eb}, (52)
where ε is thought to be arbitrarily small. In case B the Þrst order condition yields
yB1 = 1 +
b
(1 + λ)
. (53)
Notice that yB1 ≥ b+1/2 if and only if b ≤ (1 + λ) / (2λ) = bb. Thus, the optimal y1 under
the constraint y1 ≥ b+ 1/2 is given as
yB1 1{b≤bb} + (b+ 1/2) 1{b>bb}. (54)
Observe now that bb < eb. This implies that, if b ≤ bb, then yB1 is optimal. If bb < b ≤ eb, then
the kink point b + 1/2 is optimal. And if b > eb, then yA1 is optimal. Hence, the claimed
optimality of actions is shown.
As for wages, since IR1 is always binding, w1 = (y1 − (1 + b))2. As for w1 notice that
for b ≤ eb it holds that y1 ≥ b + 1/2, thus ∆w = y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1) + 2y1 − (1 + 2b)
and IR0 is binding, that is, w0 = (y0 − b)2. If b > eb, then IC0 holds with equality, thus
∆w = y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1). This yields
w0 = w1 +∆w (55)
= (y1 − (1 + b))2 + y20 − y21 − 2b (y0 − y1) (56)
= (y0 − b)2 + 1 + 2b− 2y1. (57)
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This shows the claim. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5: Notice Þrst that for given (α0,α1) it cannot be optimal to
have both IR constraints hold with strict inequality. The reason is that the feasibil-
ity of actions y and truthtelling probabilities σ depends only on the wage diﬀerential
∆w = w0 − w1. Thus, in such a case wages w could be at least slightly reduced without
changing actions and truthtelling probabilities.
However, in contrast to standard contracting problems with perfect commitment, un-
der imperfect commitment it is generally not possible to say ex ante which of the con-
straints must be binding. Therefore, to Þnd the optimum we have to go through all
possible cases and then compare the resulting utilities.
We Þrst rewrite the IC-constraints. DeÞne ∆wt the wage diﬀerential such that ICt
is binding. That is, ∆wt = α0 (y0 − (t+ b))2 − α1 (y1 − (t+ b))2. With this, the IC-
constraints write
∆w0
IC0≤ ∆w IC1≤ ∆w1. (58)
DeÞne furtherg∆w = α0 (y0 − b)2 − α1 (y1 − (1 + b))2.
Now, suppose Þrst that it is optimal to have IR0 binding. We show that there is no
feasible contract with α1 > 0. Indeed, IR0 binding implies w0 = α0 (y0 − b)2. Hence,
IR1 implies that ∆w ≤ α0 (y0 − b)2 − α1 (y1 − (1 + b))2 = g∆w. Thus, by IC0, feasibility
requires ∆w0 ≤g∆w. If α1 > 0, this is equivalent with (y1 − b)2 ≤ (y1 − (1 + b))2, or with
y1 ≥ 1/2 + b. Since y1 ≤ 1 by OPT and since b > 1/2, this is a contradiction. Hence,
α1 = 0.
Now, α1 = 0 implies that ∆w0 = g∆w = α0 (y0 − b)2. Because we must have that
∆w0 ≤ ∆w ≤ g∆w, it follows that ∆w = α0 (y0 − b)2. Since w0 = α0 (y0 − b)2, this
implies that w1 = 0. Moreover, for α0 > 0, ∆w1 > ∆w, because b > 1/2. Therefore,
by IND, A1 reports truthfully, thus, by BayR and OPT, y0 = 0. Hence, w0 = α0b2.
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Therefore, P s expected utility is
V = γ0α0λ · 0− γ0 (1− α0)λb2 − γ0α0b2 (59)
− γ1 · 0− γ1λb2 − γ1 · 0 (60)
= −γ0λb2 − γ1λb2 + γ0 (λ− 1) b2α0. (61)
Since λ > 1, α0 is optimally set to 1, and the resulting utility is
V IR0 (1, 0) = −γ0b2 − γ1λb2. (62)
For α0 = 0, we are in the case of unconditional delegation which yields utility −λb2. Since
λ > 1, this is thus worse than α0 = 1.
Suppose next that it is optimal to have IR1 binding. This implies thatw1 = α1 (y1 − (1 + b))2.
With this, IR0 requires ∆w ≥g∆w. Moreover, by IC0, ∆w ≥ ∆w0. We have seen above
that, since b > 1/2, ∆w0 ≥g∆w. That is, IR0 is implied by IC0, and it is enough to have
∆w ≥ ∆w0. Feasibility then requires that ∆w1 ≥ ∆w0 which can easily be seen to be
equivalent to
− (1/2 + b− y1)α1 + (1/2 + b+ y0)α0 ≥ 0. (63)
There are now four possible cases: it may be optimal that no, exactly one, or both
incentive constraints are binding. We consider all cases in turn.
If no incentive constraint is binding, then ∆w0 < ∆w < ∆w1. This cannot be optimal
since in this case w0 could be reduced slightly without changing the inequality, that
is, without changing the truthtelling probabilites (which equal 1 in this case) and the
resulting actions.
Suppose next that IC0 is binding, and IC1 holds with strict inequality, that is, ∆w0 =
∆w < ∆w1 Then, by IND, σ11 = 1, and hence, by BayR and OPT, y0 = 0. With this,
P s objective becomes
V = −γ0σ00λ
£
α0 · 0 + (1− α0) b2
¤
(64)
− γ0σ10λ
£
α1y
2
1 + (1− α1) b2
¤
(65)
− γ1λ
£
α1 (y1 − 1)2 + (1− α1) b2
¤
(66)
− γ0σ00w0 − γ0σ10w1 − γ1w1. (67)
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Notice that the wage bill −γ0σ00w0 − γ0σ10w1 − γ1w1 can be written as −γ0σ00∆w− w1,
where, by IR1, w1 = α1 (y1 − (1 + b))2, and, by IC0,∆w = ∆w0 = α0b2−α1 (y1 − (1 + b))2.
Moreover, with σ11 = 1, BayR and OPT imply
σ10 =
γ1 (1− y1)
γ0y1
. (68)
With this, P s problem is to choose α0,α1, and y1 ∈ [γ1, 1] so as to maximize V evaluated
atw1,∆w, σ10 subject to (63). Tedious but straightforward algebra yields that V evaluated
at w1,∆w,σ10 can be written as
V = α0 (λ− 1) b2
µ
1− γ1
y1
¶
(69)
− α1 (λ− 1) b2
µ
1− γ1
y1
¶
(70)
+ y1α1 [(λ− 1) γ1 + 2] (71)
+ α1
¡−γ1λ+ λb2 + 2γ1b− 1− 2b¢− λb2. (72)
Since all terms in the Þrst line are positive, it follows that α0 is optimally set to 1.
Notice that this is consistent with (63), and that with α0 = 1 and y0 = 0, (63) becomes
redundant. It can then be easily seen that V is monotonically increasing in y1. Thus,
y1 = 1 in the optimum. With this, V can be written as
V = α1
£
γ1λb
2 − γ1b2 + γ0 (2b− 1)
¤− γ0 (λ− 1) b2. (73)
Hence, α1 is optimally set to 1, if, and only if,
λ ≥ 1 + γ0
γ1
2b− 1
b2
= bλ. (74)
In this case, V IR1,IC0 (1, 1) = −b2 − γ0 (2b− 1). In the other case, V IR1,IC0 (1, 0) =
−γ0λb2 − γ1b2.
Suppose next that IC1 is binding, and IC0 holds with strict inequality, that is, ∆w0 <
∆w = ∆w1 Then, by IND, σ00 = 1, and hence, by BayR and OPT, y1 = 1. With this,
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P s objective becomes
V = −γ0λ
£
α0y
2
0 + (1− α0) b2
¤
(75)
− γ1σ01λ
£
α1 (y0 − 1)2 + (1− α1) b2
¤
(76)
− γ1λ
£
α1 · 0 + (1− α1) b2
¤
(77)
− γ0σ00w0 − γ0σ10w1 − γ1w1. (78)
With the same steps as in the previous paragraph it follows that V can be written as
V = α1b
2 (λ− 1) γ1 − y0
1− y0 (79)
− α0
·
2b+ 1 + (λ− 1)
µ
y0 − 1
1− y0 b
2
¶¸
(80)
− λb2. (81)
Notice that, by (63), α = (0, 1) and α = (0, 0) is not feasible. Further, it is easy to see that
for the other cases V is increasing in y0. Thus, y0 = 0 in the optimum. V thus computes
to V IR1,IC1 (1, 0) = −γ0λb2 − γ1b2, and V IR1,IC1 (1, 1) = −b2 − γ0 (2b+ 1). Hence, this is
(weakly) dominated by V IR1,IC0 , and it cannot be optimal that IC1 is binding and IC0
holds with strict inequality.
Suppose Þnally, that both incentive constraints are binding, then ∆w0 = ∆w = ∆w1,
hence by (63)
− (1/2 + b− y1)α1 + (1/2 + b+ y0)α0 = 0. (82)
But since b > 1/2 and y1 ≤ 1, this equality can only hold for α0 = α1 = 0, or α0 = α1 = 1.
Indeed, for α0 = 0,α1 = 1 the l.h.s. of (82) is equal to − (1/2 + b− y1) < 0, and for
α0 = 1,α1 = 0 the l.h.s. of (82) is equal to (1/2 + b− y0) > 0. Now, for α0 = α1 = 0,
we have unconditional delegation which, as seen above, is dominated by V IR0 (1, 0), and
thus cannot be optimal. For α0 = α1 = 1, 82 implies that y0 = y1. By OPT, it follows
that µ10 = µ11. Thus, by BayR,
σ01γ1
σ01γ1 + σ00γ0
=
σ11γ1
σ11γ1 + σ10γ0
. (83)
27
This is equivalent to σ00 = 1− σ11 = σ01. Hence
y0 = µ10 =
σ01γ1
σ01γ1 + σ00γ0
= γ1. (84)
Moreover, since y0 = y1, ∆w = 0. And since IR1 is binding, w1 = w0 = (γ1 − (1 + b))2.
Using this in P s objective yields
V IR1,IC0,IC1 (1, 1) = −γ0σ00λγ21 − γ0σ10λγ21 − γ1σ01λ (γ1 − 1)2 − γ1σ11λ (γ1 − 1)2 (85)
− (γ1 − (1 + b))2 (86)
= −γ0λγ21 − γ1λ (γ1 − 1)2 − (γ1 − (1 + b))2 (87)
= −γ0γ1λ− γ20 − 2bγ0 − b2. (88)
Now, this is dominated by V IR1,IC0 (1, 1), and thus it cannot be optimal to have both
incentive constraints binding.
In summary, we have shown that it is optimal that IR1 and IC0 are binding, and
that IC1 holds with strict inequality. In this case α = (1, 1), if, and only if, λ ≥ bλ, and
α = (1, 0) otherwise. ¤
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